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Heigh	Ho,	Heigh	Ho:			
The	Way	We	(Would	Like	to)	Work	Now	
	
I		Introduction	
Heigh	Ho,	Heigh	Ho,1	it’s	off	to	work	we	go	–	but	what	does	work	mean	and	how	can	it	be	valued	in	the	21st	century?		Sixteen	per	cent	of	workers	in	the	US	are	in	non-standard	 work	 (Katz	 and	 Krueger	 2015),	 and	 one	 in	 three	 earns	 income	from	 non-standard	 employment	 (Belman	 and	 Golden	 2000,	 Cobble	 and	 Vosko	2000).			That	is,	these	workers	do	not	have	a	standard	9	to	5	contract,	as	did	the	Seven	Dwarfs	who	clocked	off	at	5:00pm,	precisely,	and	sang	heigh	ho	on	 their	way	 home	 after	 digging	 in	 the	 mine	 all	 day.	 	 The	 “standard”	 contract	 was	 an	implicit	 promise	 of	 lifetime	 employment	 with	 explicit	 and	 implicit	 benefits,	 a	type	of	contact	that	arose	in	the	post	World	War	II	era	and	was	institutionalised	through	collective	bargaining,	 labour	law	and	social	welfare	systems	(Kalleberg	2000).		Rather,	those	in	non-standard	employment,	which	is	more	and	more	the	norm,	 may	 contend	 with	 uncertain	 hours,	 little	 continuity	 of	 employment,	reduced	 upward	 mobility,	 few	 or	 no	 employer-provided	 benefits,	 little	 legal	protection,	prohibitions	on	forming	unions,	and	minimal	access	to	social	welfare	benefits,	such	as	unemployment	 insurance	(Bernhardt	and	Marcotte	2000),	but	may	 also	 thrive	 on	 the	 freedom	of	 settings	 one’s	 own	 hours,	 negotiating	 one’s	own	salary	and	other	terms	and	conditions	of	employment.		
																																																								1	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5lYe-0CLXrs,		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HI0x0KYChq4		
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Of	those	 in	non-standard	work	arrangements,	many	choose	them	–	to	pursue	a	dream,	 to	 have	 the	 flexibility	 to	 work	 when	 and	 at	 what	 they	 please,	 to	supplement	their	pre-	or	post-retirement	income,	to	not	be	tied	down	to	one	job	(Torpay	and	Hogan	2016).		Others	take	on	non-standard	work	because	they	have	no	choice	(Bernhardt	and	Marcotte	2000,	Golden	2001).		Still	others	who	remain	in	 standard	 employment	 chafe	 at	 the	 lack	 of	 flexibility	 such	 jobs	 impose,	 but	remain	out	of	aversion	to	risk	or	for	the	non-wage	benefits	the	job	offers.			
The	 issue	 of	 standard	 (generally	 understood	 as	 inflexible)	 versus	 alternative	(generally	 understood	 as	 flexible)	 work	 arrangements	 is	 not	 new	 as	 both	workers	 (Anderson,	 et	 al.	 2003,	 Euwals	 2001,	 Blau	 and	 Shdyvko	 2011,	 Gielen	2009,	Drago	et	al.	2009,	Skinner	and	Pocock	2010,	Waterhouse	and	Colley	2010)	and	 firms	 (Askenazy	 2004,	 Connolly	 and	 Gallagher	 2004,	 May	 et	 al.	 2013b),	Hopkins	 and	 Fairfoul	 2014,	 Berg	 et	 al.	 2014)	 desire	 or	 require	 flexibility.	 And	flexibility	 in	 any	 decision	 has	 value,	 either	 positive	when	 flexibility	 is	 equated	with	 opportunity	 or	 negative	 when	 flexibility	 is	 equated	 with	 unwanted	 risk.		Quantifying	 that	 value,	 whether	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 prospective	McDonald’s	worker	considering	a	zero-hours	contract	or	McDonald’s	considering	offering	or	withdrawing	such	contracts,	remains	a	challenge.	However,	it	in	many	cases	can	be	done,	and	real	option	analysis	as	developed	in	the	finance	discipline	provides	 a	 way	 to	 value	 the	 strategic	 impact	 flexibility	 can	 have	 on	 the	individual’s	human	capital	resource	allocation,	that	is	labour	supply,	or	the	firm’s	human	 capital	 acquisition,	 that	 is	 labour	 demand,	 decisions.	 	 Real	 options,	however,	 	 do	 not	 provide	 a	mechanism	 for	 an	 employee	 to	 signal	 preferences	over	 hours	 when	 work	 schedules	 are	 non-standard	 but	 the	 employment	
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relationship	is.	 	 In	this	setting	an	internal	market	on	which	worker	preferences	for	hours	could	be	signaled	could.																
Using	 real	 option	 analysis	 and	 internal	 markets	 we	 seek	 to	 characterize	 the	strategic	 value	 of	 flexibility	 to	 the	 average	worker.	 	 To	 do	 so,	 in	 section	 II	we	provide	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 literature	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	worker	 and	then	in	section	III,	from	the	perspective	of	the	firm.		In	section	IV	we	review	the	real	option	literature	from	a	labour	contracting	perspective,	showing	how	a	real	options	 framework	 can	 reveal	 implicit	 value.	 	 Sections	 V	 –	 VII	 examine	 the	individual’s	labour	supply	choice	when,	given	a	fixed	market	wage,	contracts	are	perfectly	flexible,	when	contracts	are	perfectly	inflexible,	and	when	the	wage	is	a	random	variable	as	 in	many	gig	economy	settings,	respectively.	 	 In	section	VIII,	using	 the	 flexibility	 benchmarks	 derived	 and	 case	 studies,	 the	 option	 value	 of	flexibility	from	the	worker’s	perspective	is	characterized	using	real	options	as	a	value	 revealing	 mechanism	 and	 the	 need	 for	 an	 internal	 market	 revealed.		Section	IX	concludes.	
II		Working	for	a	Living2	
The	 demise	 of	 the	 standard	 labour	 contract	 probably	 began	 with	 its	establishment	 in	 the	 post	 World	 War	 II	 era	 when	 political	 and	 labour	 union	desires	 coalesced.	 	 In	 the	 United	 States	 politicians	wanted	 to	 ensure	 that	 war	veterans	had	access	to	education,	housing,	and	unemployment	pay,	under	the	GI	Bill,	and	stable	lifetime	employment	should	a	job	be	secured,	which	was	also	the	labour	 unions’	 goal.	 	 The	 standard	 labour	 contract,	 the	 vehicle	 designed	 to	provide	 this	 employment,	 was	 premised	 on	 the	 nuclear	 family	 with	 one																																																									2	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lcIK3akktLU	
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breadwinner	with	a	spouse	and	children	at	home.		The	contract,	which	was	both	a	social	and	a	labour	contract,	facilitated	by	an	internal	labour	market	(Doeringer	and	Piore	1971),	provided	continuity	of	employment	in	the	employer’s	place	of	business	and	under	the	employer’s	supervision,	while	requiring	the	employee	to	work,	 at	 least,	 an	 eight-hour	 day,	 five	 days	 a	week,	 fifty	weeks	 per	 year,	 with	anticipated	career	advancement,	 compensated	overtime,	and	benefits	 including	health	insurance	and	a	company	pension.		Married	women	were	not	expected	to	work,	at	least	once	their	children	were	born,	and	were	not	expected	to	return	to	the	 labour	 force	 after	 their	 children	 had	 entered	 or	 finished	 school.	 	 The	‘marriage	bar’	existed	in	many	countries,	up	to	the	1950’s	in	the	US	but	as	late	as	1973	 in	 Ireland,	 and	part	 time	work	was	 rare	 (Goldin,	 2006).	 This	 contractual	structure	 provided	 income	 security	 to	 those	 lucky	 enough	 to	 be	 employed	 on	such	 contracts	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 flexibility,	 both	 for	 workers	 and	 firms	(Bosch	 2004,	 Kalleberg	 2000).	 Income	 of	 the	 breadwinner	 was	 expected	 to	support	a	family,	justifying	differential	pay	rates	for	males	and	females.			
In	 1995,	 recognizing	 that	 the	 standard	 contract,	 while	 still	 dominant,	 was	characterizing	 fewer	employment	relationships	than	 in	the	past,	 the	US	Bureau	of	 Labor	 Statistics	 conducted	 a	 survey	 to	 supplement	 its	 Current	 Population	Survey	 to	 determine	 the	 prevalence	 and	 characteristics	 of	 non-standard	employment	 relationships.	 	At	 that	 time	approximately	10	percent	of	 the	work	force	 was	 in	 contingent	 employment	 where	 workers	 were	 either	 working	 as	independent	 contractors,	 on-call	 workers,	 temporary	 help-agency	 workers	 or	contract	 company	 employees	 (Cohany	 1996).	 	 In	 1995	 most	 in	 contingent	employment	 were	 prime-aged,	 college-educated	 white	 males	 working	 as	independent	contractors	in	construction	or	professional	and	business	services.			
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Demographic	changes	brought	about	by	married	women	re-entering	the	labour	force	 (Anderson	 et	 al.	 2003,	 Klerman	 and	 Leibowitz	 1990)	 and	 older	workers	extending	 their	working	 lives	 (Junh	 and	 Potter	 2006)	 increased	 the	 desire	 for	alternatives	 to	 the	 standard	 contract	 (Schmid	 2010,	 Blau	 and	 Shdyvko	 2011,	Gielen	2009).	 	 	While	important,	this	push	for	change	came	not	from	those	who	necessarily	needed	 to	work	but	 from	 those	who	wanted	 to	work	 in	a	way	 that	best	suited	their	needs	while	still	availing	of	employment-related	benefits	either	directly	 or	 through	 a	 spouse.	 The	 trend	 toward	 non-standard	 employment	 is	clearly	seen	in	the	United	States	where,	as	Katz	and	Krueger	(2016)	show,	almost	all	the	net	growth	in	employment	in	the	2005	–	2015	period	can	be	attributed	to	increases	 in	 non-standard	 employment	 relationships.	 	 They	 find	 that	 the	percentage	 of	 the	 labour	 force	 engaged	 on	 non-standard/alternative	 work	arrangements	has	 risen	 from	10.1%	 in	2005	 to	15.8%	 in	2015,	 and	 that	 these	workers	with	 alternative	work	 arrangements	 in	 2015	 compared	with	 those	 in	2005	were	more	likely	to	be	female,	older,	college	educated,	in	the	higher	wage	quintiles,	work	 for	 contract	 or	 temporary	help	 firms,	 and	work	 in	professional	and	 business	 services,	 health,	 education	 and	 other	 services	 rather	 than	 in	construction	or	manufacturing.		
Flexible,	 alternative	work	 arrangements	 reflect	 both	 choice	 and	 lack	 of	 choice.		That	 is,	 some	 actively	 seek	 employment	 opportunities	 that	 enable	 them	 to	flexibly	 adjust	 their	 hours	 worked,	 while	 others	 find	 that	 alternative	 work	arrangements	are	the	default	option	when	no	other	work	or	no	other	work	that	enables	 the	worker	 to	meet	 her/his	 non-work	 obligations	 is	 available	 (Golden	
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2001,	 Bernhardt	 and	Marcotte	 2000,	 Anderson,	 et	 al.	 2003).3		With	 the	 rise	 of	alternative	 work	 arrangements,	 arrangements	 often	 sought	 by	 workers,	 has	come	 the	 dismantling	 rather	 than	 the	 redesign	 of	 the	 internal	 labour	markets,	the	 institutional	 structure	within	 firms	 that	 supported	 the	 standard	 contract’s	promise	of	within	firm	career	advancement	(Wilthagen	and	Tros	2004).	 	A	side	effect	of	 the	demise	of	 these	 internal	 labour	markets	has	been	the	reduction	of	opportunities	for	internal	progression	within	firms	(Broschak	and	George	2003).		Now	improving	one’s	skills	is	left	to	each	worker’s	individual	initiative	(Giudetti	and	Pedrini	2013)	and	career	advancement	takes	place	across	rather	than	within	firms.		In	addition,	to	access	flexible	hours,	a	worker	may	have	to	work	more	or	less	and	accept	an	unpredictable	work	schedule	preferred	by	the	firm	(Danziger	and	 Boots	 2008,	 Waterhouse	 and	 Colley	 2010,	 Askenazy	 2004)	 and	 often	generated	by	scheduling	software.	The	value	of	 flexibility	depends	on	 its	affect	on	 income	 security	 (Skinner	 and	Pocock	2010,	Horowitz	2000,	Andersen	 et	 al.	2007),	where	the	value	of	flexibility	can,	but	need	not,	fall	as	security	decreases	(Golden	 2001).	Thus,	 flexible	 alternative	work	 arrangements,	 at	 least	 from	 the	workers’	 perspective,	 are	 perceived	 as	 a	 mixed	 blessing	 (Hipp	 and	 Anderson	2015,	Hopkins	and	Fairfoul	2014,	Buddelmeyer	et	al.	2015).				
	
III		Harder,	Better,	Faster4		
																																																								3	In	practice,	characteristics	of	observed	flexibility	differ	by	gender	(May	et	al.	2013a,	Ferber	and	Waldfogel	2000),	age	(Blau	and	Shdyvko	2011,	Gielen	2009),	education	and	skills	(Anderson	et	al.	2003,	Polivka	et	al.	2000)	and	race	(Polivka,	et	al.	2000,	Ferber	and	Waldfogel	2000),	and	may	be	beneficial	or	detrimental	to	eventually	gaining	a	standard	contract	(Givord	and	Wilner	2014).	4	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gAjR4_CbPpQ	
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The	 lack	of	 flexibility	of	 the	standard	 labour	contract,	 initially	considered	to	be	one	of	 its	better	 features,	became	a	binding	constraint	 in	the	1970s.	 	 Increased	competition	and	uncertainty,	more	rapid	technological	change,	slower	economic	growth	 and	 high	 rates	 of	 unemployment	 all	 conspired	 to	 make	 more	 flexible	work	relationships	necessary,	feasible,	and	desired	by	some	but	by	no	means	all	participants	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 labour	 market,	 making	 their	 introduction	possible,	 but	 not	 necessarily	 straightforward.	 	 Institutional	 structures,	 such	 as	labour	 laws	 that	 supported	 the	 standard	 contract,	 required	 contractual	innovation	by	firms	to	secure	the	flexibility	they	coveted.		
If	 standard	 contracts	 are	 rigid,	 alternative	work	 arrangements	 are	 flexible	 and	diverse,	with	supervision	and	employment	relationships	often	divorced	from	the	place	of	work	and	for	whom	the	work	is	done.	 	Alternative	work	arrangements	include	part-time	contracts,	temporary	agency	and	contract	company	contracts,	short-term	contracts,	contingent	work,	such	as	zero-hours	and	on-call	contracts,	self-employment/independent	 contracting	 and	 online	 platform	 tethered	 gigs.		Standard	 contracts,	 precisely	 because	 of	 the	 social	 contract	 under	 which	 they	were	established	and	 the	 law	and	 custom	 that	 supports	 them,	provide	 job	and	income	security,	career	progression,	etc.,	but	can	be	costly	(Kalleberg	2003)	to	a	firm	 that	 requires	 agility	 to	 compete	 in	 the	 market.	 	 Alternative	 work	arrangements,	in	contrast,	provide	flexibility	both	for	employers	and	employees	alike,	but	may	be	insecure	(Drache	et	al.	2015,	Wilthagen	and	Tros	2004,	Berg	el	at.	2014).		They	allow	firms	to	control	costs,	to	improve	efficiency,	and	to	match	their	just-in-time	inventory	systems	or	the	peaks	and	troughs	of	retail	foot	traffic	with	just-in-time	labour	input	(Kalleberg	2003),	often	using	scheduling	software	
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that	 removes	 local	 managerial	 control	 over	 staffing	 decisions.	 	 To	 introduce	alternative	work	arrangements	effectively,	firms	dismantled	their	internal	labour	markets	 since	 these	 more	 flexible	 employment	 structures	 were	 incompatible	with	 internal	 firm	 career	 paths	 (Giudetti	 and	 Pedrini	 2013).	 	 Other	 internal	restructuring	 by	 firms	 in	 search	 of	 enhanced	 efficiency	 is	 often	 required	 since	fixed	 teams	 and	 other	 inflexible	 internal	 firm	 structures	 (Broschak	 and	Davis-Blake	2006,	Davis-Blake,	et	al.	2003,	Kalleberg	2003)	may	be	incompatible	with	a	largely	 transient	 workforce.	 	 When	 workers	 on	 alternative	 arrangements	 and	permanent	 workers	 work	 together,	 the	 firm’s	 human	 resource	 structure	 can	create	 insiders	 and	 outsiders	 (Piori	 1986,	 Lindbeck	 and	 Snower	 1988)	sometimes	 engendering	 conflict	 (Kalleberg	 2003).	 Use	 of	 these	 arrangements,	because	 workers	 rights	 are	 not	 generally	 as	 well	 protected	 in	 non-standard	contracting	 relationships,	 has	 enabled	 unethical	 yet	 legal	 treatment	 of	 the	 low	skilled	and	the	marginalised	(Drache,	et	al.	2015)	as	well	as	migrants	(McCollum	and	 Findlay	 2015)	 who	 lack	 the	 support	 of	 labour	 unions	 and	 labour	 law	(Wilthagen	 and	 Tros	 2004,	 Berg	 et	 al.	 2014),	 all	 in	 the	 quest	 for	 higher	shareholder	value.		
IV		Options5	
While	 it	 is	 now	 widely	 agreed	 that	 flexibility	 in	 any	 decision	 has	 value,	quantifying	 that	 value	 remains	 a	 challenge.	 Real	 option	 analysis	 is	 one	way	 in	which	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 value	 the	 impact	 flexibility	 has	 on	 allocating	 human	 or	physical	 capital	 resources.	 Real	 options	 originate	 in	 the	 finance	 discipline	 and	
																																																								5	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DYApHEUCs8s		
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were	 originally	 applied	 to	 long-term	 investment	 decisions	 where	 the	 up-front	costs	of	 investment	are	high	and	optimal	 timing	 is	of	 considerable	 importance.		Traditionally,	 they	are	used	when	making	research	and	development	decisions,	high	cost	facility	production	investments,	and	energy	investment	decisions.	From	a	firm’s	perspective,	real	options	are	a	particularly	valuable	decision	making	tool	under	conditions	where	there	is	a	high	level	of	uncertainty.		Real	option	analysis	is	now	being	applied	more	generally	to	other	strategic	decisions.		
A	real	option	is	the	right	but	not	the	obligation	to	undertake	a	business	decision	and,	 as	 such,	 can	 and	 is	 applied	 to	 employment	 contract	 types.	 	 From	 a	 firm’s	perspective,	 the	application	and	value	attached	 to	 the	real	options	approach	 in	deciding	what	type	of	employment	contract	to	issue	is	relatively	straightforward.	By	hiring	workers	on	temporary	or	zero-hour	contracts,	the	firm	undertakes	no	long-term	 obligation	 to	 retain	 these	 workers,	 thus	 providing	 flexibility	 and	limiting	 obligations	 and	 costs	 associated	 with	 permanent	 contracts.	 	 If	 new	information	emerges,	for	example	with	respect	to	increased	demand	or	success	of	 a	 product,	 or	with	 respect	 to	 the	 quality	 and	 capabilities	 of	 the	worker,	 the	firm	can	exercise	the	option	to	expand/abandon/delay	as	such	uncertainties	are	resolved.	 Therefore,	 downside	 risks	 can	 be	 minimised	 while	 upside	opportunities	can	be	exploited.		
In	the	literature,	many	authors	observe	that	non-standard	employment	contracts	should	be	viewed	as	a	source	of	flexibility	and	can	enable	irreversible	investment	decisions	 to	 be	 delayed	 (see	 for	 example	 Van	 Emmerick	 and	 Sanders	 2004,	Musselin	 2005).	 	 Foote	 and	 Folta	 (2002)	 argue	 and	 Bhattacharya	 and	Wright	
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(2005)	 confirm	 that	 there	 is	 more	 value	 to	 hiring	 workers	 using	 temporary	contracts	at	greater	levels	of	uncertainty	and	irreversibility.		
While	 the	 real	 option	 value	 to	 different	 types	 of	 employment	 contracts	 is	 not	difficult	 to	 see	 from	 an	 employer’s	 perspective,	 the	 real	 option	 value	 from	 an	employee’s	point	of	view	is	not	as	obvious.		The	general	consensus	appears	to	be	that	 employers	 gain	 from	 using	 non-standard	 employment	 contracts	 at	 the	expense	 of	 employees.	 However,	 in	 a	 review	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 non-standard	employment	contracts	on	individual	workers,	Walker	(2011)	notes	that	“the	task	of	 evaluating	 non-standard	 employment	 is	 far	 from	 straightforward”.	 	 He	 also	observes	that	while	some	workers	appear	to	be	disadvantaged	by	non-standard		employment	contracts,	others	appear	to	be	able	to	use	them	to	their	benefit	and	that	workers	actually	seem	to	weigh	up	 the	costs	and	benefits	of	non-standard	contracts.	 	 While	 non-standard	 employment	 contracts	 are	 typically	 viewed	 as	costly	 to	 the	worker	due	 to	 limited	 jobs	security,	 lower	benefits,	 lack	of	 career	progression	 and	 uncertain	 hours,	 there	 are	 also	 situations	where	workers	 can	negotiate	 non-standard	 work	 contracts	 that	 enhance	 work/family	 balance	without	 a	 decrease	 in	 job	 security	 or	 compensation.	 	 The	 presence	 of	competition	 affects	 the	 value	 of	 flexibility	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 this	 enhanced	bargaining	 power	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 restricted	 to	 those	workers	 with	 greater	 and	scarcer	skills	who	are	in	high	demand.		
In	 order	 to	 determine	whether	 there	 is	 a	 real	 option	 value	 to	 employees	 from	undertaking	 non-standard	 employment	 contracts,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 identify	sources	 of	 flexibility	 and	 uncertainty.	 	 Arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 such	 contracts	include	 greater	 flexibility,	 an	 improved	 work-life	 balance,	 increased	 earning	
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potential,	 greater	 control	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 leave	 the	 employment	 quickly.		Considering	these	arguments,	it	is	probable	that	such	non-standard	employment	contracts	might	have	options	embedded	in	them	for	workers.		For	example,	given	that	some	non-standard	employment	contracts	give	the	worker	the	right	but	not	the	obligation	to	work,	 it	has	characteristics	similar	to	a	call	option.	 	Further,	a	worker	 might	 consider	 taking	 on	 a	 temporary	 contract	 today	 because	 even	though	it	is	not	optimal	now,	significant	opportunities	may	arise	to	gain	access	to	a	permanent	contract	or	position	the	worker	to	get	a	more	desirable,	higher	paid	job	 (akin	 to	 a	 real	 option	 to	 expand).	 	 Alternatively,	 unlike	 some	 permanent	contracts,	most	non-standard	employment	contracts	do	not	have	long	minimum	notice	periods	a	worker	has	to	give	before	leaving	employment.	 	This	can	make	an	 otherwise	 unappealing	 job	 appealing	 as	 it	 allows	 a	 worker	 to	 leave	immediately	to	undertake	a	better	employment	opportunity	or	if	the	costs	of	the	job	begin	to	outweigh	the	benefits.		The	value	to	the	worker	would	be	similar	to	a	put	option	 to	abandon.	 	 	However,	many	non-standard	work	arrangements	are	non-standard	 in	 terms	 of	work	 schedule	 flexibility	 rather	 than	 in	 terms	 of	 the	employment	 relationship.	 	 This	 flexibility,	 beneficial	 from	 the	 employer’s	perspective,	 is	 costly	 to	 the	 worker,	 who	 would	 like	 to	 be	 able	 to	 signal	preferences	for	work	times	and	hours	worked,	because	of	significant	differences	in	net	wages	at	different	times	of	day	and	days	of	week,	but	lacks	the	mechanism,	essentially	a	market	within	the	firm,	to	do	so.				
It	 should	be	noted	 that	not	all	non-standard	employment	 contracts	will	have	a	real	 option	 value.	 	Workers	 on	 non-standard	 employment	 contracts	 are	 not	 a	homogenous	group	and	whether	there	are	valuable	real	options	embedded	in	the	
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contracts	 to	 the	employee	 is	dependent	on	what	 type	of	 subset	 they	belong	 to.		The	idea	of	there	being	value	to	employees	of	non-standard	work	contracts	that	is	captured	by	real	options	and	quantified	using	financial	valuation	models	relies	on	 requirements	 such	 that	 flexibility	 strategies	 are	 both	 creditable	 and	executable	 and	 that	 individuals	 will	 be	 rational	 in	 deciding	 to	 execute	 real	options.	 	 These	 requirements	 again	 reinforce	 the	 earlier	 claim	 that	 the	individuals	 most	 likely	 to	 derive	 real	 option	 value	 from	 non-standard	 work	contracts	belong	to	a	subset	of	workers	that	are	highly	skilled,	well	compensated	and	 are	 least	 likely	 to	 have	 the	 need	 to	 negotiate	 flexible	work	 arrangements.		Individuals	who	are	most	likely	to	have	limited	real	option	value	with	respect	to	choice	of	work	contract	are	lower	skilled,	lower	paid	workers	who	are	generally	seen	 not	 to	 offer	 such	 creditability	 but	 who	 would	 benefit	 from	 a	 preference	revealing	internal	market.			
V		Somewhere	over	the	Rainbow6		
The	 complexity	 of	 real	world	 decision-making	 can	 often	 hide	 the	 fundamental	choices	individuals	must	make.		This	is	clearly	the	case	in	an	individual’s	choice	of	whether	and	how	much	to	work	in	the	market.		The	choice	of	(market)	labour	and	 leisure	where	 individuals	 or	 families	making	 joint	 decisions	 value	 income	from	market	(total	remuneration	including	benefits	which	are	dependent	on	the	individual’s/family’s	 human	 capital)	 and	 non-labour	 sources	 (government	programs	and	 investment	 returns)	 and	 leisure	where	 leisure	 is	 constrained	by	unremunerated,	 fixed-time,	 but	 often	 uncertain	 activities,	 at	 least	 in	 terms	 of	their	timing,	(think	of	caring	for	a	child	or	an	aged	parent,	being	in	education	or																																																									6	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U016JWYUDdQ	
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training,	 commuting)	 some	 of	 which	 may	 be	 reduced	 by	 outsourcing	 to	 the	market,	 should	 income	 be	 adequate,	 or	 by	 state	 provision,	 is	 conceptually	straightforward	when	 there	 are	no	external	 (think	employer	 imposed	or	other	institutional)	constraints	on	choice.				
The	 ability	 to	 transfer	unremunerated	 fixed	 time	activities	 to	 the	market	 or	 to	the	 state	 also	 depends	 on	 the	 individual’s	 socio-economic	 environment.	 	 This	environment	is	described	by	where	the	individual	lives,	the	market	services	that	can	 be	 accessed,	 the	 presence	 or	 absence	 of	 a	 spouse,	 the	 labour	 force	attachment	of	that	spouse,	the	benefits	linked	to	that	spouse’s	employment,	the	informal	 networks	 to	 which	 the	 individual	 belongs	 which	 can	 range	 from	LinkedIn	or	other	employment	related	social	network	to	a	babysitting	exchange,	the	 proximity	 to	 and	 the	 relationship	 with	 his/her	 extended	 family,	 the	availability	and	reliability	of	transportation	both	public	and	private,	government	provided	 social	 services	 (elder	 care,	 after	 school	 programs,	 etc.)	 and	 whether	they	are	means	tested	or	universally	provided,	 the	number	and	age	of	children	and	the	number,	age	and	health	status	of	disabled	children	and/or	aged	relatives,	the	variability	and	skewness	of	other	sources	of	income,	among	other	things.				
The	 labour/leisure	 choice	 is	 a	 textbook	 labour	 supply	 decision,	 where	 here	labour	 supply	 is	 contingent	 on	 the	 realization	 life,	 rather	 than	 work,	 related	uncertainty.			If	labour	markets	are	perfectly	competitive,	if	she	is	willing	to	work	at	or	below	the	equilibrium	wage,	even	if	for	just	a	few	hours	on	just	a	few	days,	she	will	be	employed.		The	world,	however,	does	not	conform	to	the	model.	
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VI		Shiftwork7	
While	 the	 standard	 model	 of	 the	 labour/leisure	 choice	 is	 simple	 even	 taking	account	 of	 random,	 fixed-time	 unremunerated	 activities,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 labour	market	 that	 the	 potential	 worker	 generally	 encounters.	 	 Instead,	 the	 labour	market	 in	which	workers	 sell	 their	 human	 capital	 is	 beset	with	 constraints	 in	terms	of	the	contracts	on	offer	and	their	ability	to	negotiate	a	contract	specific	to	their	needs.		They	range	from	the	“standard	contract”,	to	the	zero-hours	and	on-call	contract	where	a	worker	agrees	to	be	available	for	work	that	she	or	he	can	choose	to	take	if	it	is	offered	in	the	case	of	the	zero-hours	contract	and	must	take	in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 on-call	 contract,	 to	 the	 independent	 contractor	 style	 “gig”	where	 the	worker	 chooses	 to	work	 or	 not	 and	 there	 is	work	 or	 not	when	 the	worker	chooses	to	work	(think	a	Task	Rabbit	or	an	Uber	driver).	 	The	ability	of	workers	 to	 vary	 their	 hours	 at	 will	 or	 at	 all	 depends	 on	 the	 type	 of	 job	(independent	contract,	gig	or	member	of	a	team),	the	importance	of	the	workers’	skills	 to	 the	 organization	 (easily	 replaced	 or	 not),	 market	 rigidities	 (standard	business	hours,	extended	business	hours,	night	shifts	or	split	shifts,	an	hour	here	or	 there),	 administrative	 rigidities,	 worker	 protection	 legislation	 or	 union	contract	conditions,	where	 in	most	cases	 it	 is	 the	employer	rather	than	worker	who	determines,	within	reason	and	under	the	specific	labour	contract	and	within	the	confines	of	 labour	 law,	when	and	how	much	workers	work	(Lambert,	et	al.	2014),	 subject,	 of	 course,	 to	 the	 workers’	 willingness	 to	 work	 under	 those	conditions.					
																																																								7	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VfiJEfBNRqg	
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Consider	 the	 standard	 contract.	 In	 this	 case	 the	 agent	 has	 limited	 choice	 over	when	 to	 work	 and	 leisure	 absorbs	 all	 the	 fixed	 time	 requirements	 of	 all	unremunerated	 activities	 that,	 where	 not	 provided	 by	 the	 state,	 cannot	 be	outsourced	 to	 the	 market.	 	 	 Clearly,	 how	 well	 off	 the	 individual	 is	 under	 the	standard	 contract	 and	 her	 ideal	 contract	 are	 not	 the	 same.	 	 	 A	 similar	 choice	structure	is	faced	by	the	agent	who	is	presented	with	a	fixed-term	contract,		shift	work,	 whether	 it	 be	 9	 to	 5,	 7	 to	 3,	 3	 to	 11,	 11	 to	 7	 or	 some	 variation	 or	combination	thereof,	part-time	work	with	specific	daily	or	weekly	hours,	or	part-time	work	with	 total	hours	 specified	and	 certain,	 or	unspecified	and	uncertain	(possibly	 a	 zero-hours	 or	 on-call	 contract),	 in	 which	 case	 labour	 hours	 are	 a	random	variable,	where	 in	all	 cases	 the	shift	 structure	and	accompanying	 total	remuneration	 on	 offer	 are	 contractually	 determined.	 	 Faced	with	 such	 a	 set	 of	contracts,	 the	 agent	 chooses	 which	 is	 best,	 keeping	 in	mind	 that	 withdrawing	from	the	labour	force	is	always	an	option.	
	
VII		Uber	Driver8	
At	 the	 opposite	 extreme,	 consider	 the	 “gig”	worker.	 For	 this	worker	 the	wage	received	is	random,	depends	on	the	time	of	day,	the	day	of	the	week,	on	whom	else	is	working,	and	what	tasks	or	rides	are	on	offer;	that	it	is	fully	realised	only	after	 the	work	hours	have	been	 completed	and	 that	 there	are	no	work	 related	benefits.		In	addition	there	are	fixed	and	variable	costs	that	must	be	borne	by	the	worker,	leading	to	a	random	net	wage.			The	gig	worker	is,	or	at	least	is	seen	to	be	by	the	online	platforms,	such	as	Uber	and	TaskRabbit,	a	sole	proprietor	who	uses																																																									8		https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggczfsIrZvg		
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their	marketing	services	and	agrees	to	certain	work	practices.		Thus,	for	the	Uber	driver,	labour	choice	is	completely	flexible	but	income	is	uncertain.	
	
VIII		My	Way9	
The	 labour	 market	 faced	 by	 most	 workers	 lies	 between	 the	 no	 flexibility	standard	contract	and	the	complete	flexibility	gig	economy.		Neither	the	former	nor	 the	 latter	 perfectly	 meet	 most	 workers	 needs,	 yet	 individually	 optimal,	rather	than	flexible,	per	se,	work	arrangements	are	valued	by	the	worker.	 	The	value	to	the	worker	of	being	able	to	set	her	personally	optimal	schedule	is	likely	to	 be	 contingent	 on	 her	 human	 and	 financial	 capital,	 the	 socio-economic	environment	in	which	she	lives	and	the	constraints	imposed	by	unremunerated	fixed-time	activities.				
A	 major	 unremunerated	 fixed,	 but	 variable,	 time	 activity	 is	 education.	 	 Many	students	 need	 or	 want	 to	 earn	 money	 to	 pay	 for	 their	 education,	 to	 support	themselves	 while	 in	 education,	 and/or	 to	 save.	 	 Because	 of	 their	 very	 varied	schedules,	 they	require	employers	who	are	willing	 to	accommodate	 their	work	and	study	schedules	that	can	vary	from	day	to	day	and	week	to	week	depending	on	 classes,	 assignments,	 field	 trips	 and	 exams.	 	 McDonald’s	 hires	 very	 large	numbers	 of	 students	 and,	 whether	 they	 are	 in	 high	 school,	 like	 the	 Langford	sisters,	or	college,	like	David	Sawiak,	accommodates	their	schedules	while	giving	them	valuable	work	experience	(D’Alessandro	2017)	via	zero-hour,	or	zero-hour	like	contracts,	where	shifts/hours	can	be	refused.		When	McDonald’s	offered	its	
																																																								9	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kl4Uh5nOFAg	
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workers	fixed-time,	part-time	contracts	in	the	UK,	80	percent	of	those	offered	the	contracts	chose	to	remain	on	their	zero-hour	contracts	(Ahmed	2017).			
Similarly,	 those	 who	 work	 for	 TaskRabbit,	 Mechanical	 Turk	 or	 Wahve	 or	 an	agency	 like	 Kelly	 Services,	 who	 may	 take	 on	 this	 type	 of	 employment	 in	preference	to	other	work,	like	Brian	Schrier,	who	lives	half	the	week	on	his	boat	in	Napa	working	in	San	Francisco	for	TaskRabbit	the	other	half	week,	and	David	Cordova,	who	has	found	a	niche	in	New	York	City	for	his	services	and	relies	on	his	 wife	 for	 health	 insurance	 and	 other	 benefits	 (Zimmermann	 2015),	 or	 in	addition	 to	 their	 regular	 work,	 in	 between	 other	 jobs	 as	 they	 search	 for	permanent	employment,	the	most	usual	case	(Katz	and	Kreuger	2016),	while	in	education	 or	 on	 an	 internship,	 like	 Jonathan	 Lal	 (Zimmerman	 2015)	 or	 after	retirement	from	full-time	employment,	like	William	who,	as	a	Tasker,	assembles	IKEA	furniture	(Carter	2016)	or	Karen	Arnold	who	works	from	home	as	a	Wahve	worker	 in	 the	 insurance	 industry	 (Farrell	 2015),	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 determine	how	much	 and	when	 they	want	 to	work	 at	what	 tasks	 and,	 for	 some,	 at	what	wage.	 	Fixed	time	activities	can	be	worked	around	by,	 for	those	on	TaskRabbit,	by	 only	 specifying	 unencumbered	 hours.	 	 The	 Mechanical	 Turk	 allows	 you	 to	work	 to	 your	own	 schedule	 as	 long	 as	 you	meet	 the	deadline	 specified	 for	 the	task.	 	 While	 TaskRabbit	 jobs	 require	 the	 worker	 to	 go	 to	 the	 workplace,	Mechanical	Turk	 	and	Wahve	 jobs	are	done	 from	home	(Raphael	2014).	 	While	some	of	 the	 jobs	 require	physical	 strength	 and	dexterity	 (Zimmermann	2015),	others	just	require	the	right	brain	power.			These	employment	relationships,	the	McDonald’s	zero-hours	contracts	to	the	gigs,	from	the	perspective	of	the	worker,	are	 like	 call	 options	 in	 that	 they	have	 the	 right	but	not	 the	obligation	 to	work.		Since	 these	 positions	 can	 lead	 to	 other,	 more	 desirable	 work,	 for	 example	 a	
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permanent	job	with	a	firm	for	whom	one	has	temped,	workers	would	also	hold	a	real	option	to	expand.	 	 	And,	when	the	job	can	be	abandoned	quickly	with	little	cost,	 for	 example	 if	 a	 better,	 permanent	 job	 is	 found,	 the	 relationship	 contains	the	 characteristics	 of	 a	 put	 option.	 	 In	 all	 cases	 the	 worker	 has	 the	 option	 to	delay.			
In	contrast,	 consider,	 Jannette	Navarro	 (Kantor	2014),	 for	whom	flexibility	 is	a	curse	 rather	 than	 a	 blessing.	 	 Ms	 Navarro	 a	 single	 mother	 with	 one	 child	 the	father	of	whom	is	not	providing	child	support,	with	no	immediate	family	as	her	parents	 are	 both	 dead.	 	 In	 2014	 she	was	working	 at	 Starbucks	 as	 a	 barista	 at	$9.00	an	hour.		She	relied	on	public	transportation,	a	series	of	busses	and	trams,	to	get	her	son	to	daycare	and	herself	to	work.		Her	son	was	in	a	state-supported	daycare	program,	access	to	which	was	dependent	on	her	getting	adequate	hours.		Her	 hours,	 which	 were	 so	 erratic	 that	 her	 weekly	 hours	 might	 not	 meet	 the	requirement	for	her	son’s	daycare	provision	and/or	the	simple	necessities	of	life	including	 food	 and	 rent,	 were	 governed	 by	 Starbucks’s	 scheduling	 program,	which	meant	she	would	often	get	her	hours	only	three	days	in	advance,	and	if	she	was	scheduled	for	nights,	very	early	mornings,	weekends	or	holidays	she	would	have	 to	 rely	 on	 her	 aunt	 or	 friends	 to	 take	 care	 of	 her	 son,	 which	 was	 not	sustainable.	 	 Moreover,	 her	 schedule	 was	 such	 that	 she	 could	 not	 invest	 in	completing	her	education,	 the	most	effective	way	to	 improve	her	and	her	son’s	life	 chances.	 	 	 Thus,	 the	 costs	 of	 her	 unremunerated	 fixed-time	 activities	were	unnecessarily	 high	 as	 a	 result	 of	 her	 very	 erratic	work	 schedule,	 leading	 to	 an	effective	 wage	 much	 less	 than	 $9.00	 per	 hour.	 “Flexibility”	 was	 not	 her	 goal,	rather	it	was	a	feature	of	the	type	of	job	she	was	qualified	to	do	which	met	her	employer’s	 rather	 than	her	 needs,	 needs	 her	 employer	 did	 not	 even	 know	 she	
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had	since	scheduling	was	set	by	a	optimizing	software	program	rather	than	the	equally	uninformed	store	manager.		Instead,	she	would	have	been	willing	to	pay	for	a	reduction	in	“flexibility”	which	to	her	would	be	equivalent	to	a	reduction	in	risk.	 	Her	willingness	 to	pay	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	 a	potential	 gain	 to	both	her	and	to	her	employer.	Making	these	gains	transparent	to	the	firm	via	an	internal	market	mechanism	where	workers	could	 “bid”	 for	day/hour	combinations	 that	would	 reveal	 the	 “market	 price”	 for	 different	 schedules,	 could	 lead	 to	 better	scheduling	outcomes	either	through	improved	software	where	the	“market”	data	is	 incorporated	 into	 the	 algorithm	 or	 a	 return	 to	 more	 devolved	 scheduling	which	 could	 enhance	 workers’	 work/life	 balance	 and,	 thereby,	 worker	productivity	and	firm	profitability.	Her	experience	 is	not	unique	as	the	work	of	Henly	 and	 Lambert	 (2015)	 and	 Seefeldt	 and	 Sandstrom	 (2015)	 attest,	 but	 its	revelation	 in	 a	 New	 York	 Times	 article	 did	 lead	 Starbucks	 to	 change	 its	scheduling	practices.			
At	 the	 other	 end	 of	 the	 income	 scale	 are	 IT	 Contractors,	 like	 Andy	 D.	 with	 in	demand	specialist	skills.	 	He	had	a	two-and–a-half	hour	commute,	each	way,	by	public	 transportation,	 and	worked	 very	 long	 hours	 on	 a	 seven-month	 contract	developing	 and	 integrating	 new	 software	 into	 the	 existing	 system	 for	 an	international	bank.		This	new	software	would	be	rolled	out	in	the	bank’s	offices	worldwide.		This	required	conversations	with	those	who	would	be	end-users	at	times	 that	 suited	 them.	 	 He	 billed	 the	 hours	 he	worked,	 and	 he	worked	 in	 an	office	with	full-time	permanent	staff	as	part	of	a	contract	team.		His	pay	rate	was	much	higher	 than	permanent	 staff	members,	but	he	and	 the	other	members	of	the	 contract	 team	 had	 to	 deliver	 the	 work	 contracted	 in	 the	 time	 specified	requiring	 very	 long	 working	 days	 and	 working	 weeks	 for	 the	 duration	 of	 the	
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contract	which,	for	operational	reasons,	gave	the	contract	team	a	month	off	mid-contract	 which	 he	 spent	 vacationing	 in	 France.	 	 Flexibility,	 for	 Andy,	 was	achieved	not	on	a	day-to-day	basis	within	a	job,	but	over	the	course	of	the	year	and	 across	 contracts	 with	 different	 employers:	 	 the	 call	 option	 aspect	 of	flexibility	was	not	having	to	take	all	contracts	offered	and	being	paid	enough	to	afford	 to	 invest	 in	 the	 benefits,	 such	 as	 health	 insurance,	 a	 pension,	 and	vacations,	that	were,	in	the	past,	paid	for	by	the	employer	(Quantnet.com	2010).		
							
IX			Conclusion	 	
The	standard	labour	contract	was	in	many	ways	an	attempt	to	impose	normalcy	on	a	world	still	riven	by	the	effects	of	two	world	wars	and	the	Great	Depression.		Under	 the	 standard	 contract,	 simultaneously	 a	 labour	 and	 a	 social	 contract,	 a	man	 would	 be	 able	 to	 provide	 for	 his	 family,	 have	 secure	 employment	throughout	his	 life,	and	retire	on	a	comfortable	pension.	 	All	was	well	with	 the	world.		The	problem	was	that	the	world	did	not	conform	to	the	standard	labour	contract,	the	rigidity	of	which	was	neither	good	for	firms	nor	for	workers.		It	also	created	 unachievable	 expectations	 since	 it	 was	 designed	 to	 provide	 for	 the	worker,	 body	 and	 soul.	 	 It	 was,	 however,	 enshrined	 in	 labour	 law.	 	 Now	 both	workers	and	firms	desire	greater	flexibility,	but	the	flexibility	workers	think	they	want	and	need	is	not	necessarily	the	flexibility	firms	think	they	want	and	need.		And	firms	no	longer	have	the	ability,	should	they	ever	have	had,	of	providing	the	social	contract	the	standard	contract	demands.	
By	specifying	the	option	value	of	flexibility	or	inflexibility	to	a	worker,	this	paper	makes	clear	what	a	worker	has	to	give	and	the	constraints	and	source	of	 those	
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constraints	 the	worker	 faces.	 	 It	 also	makes	 clear	 the	 costs	 of	 accepting	 a	 less	than	optimal	contract.		These	costs	point	to	a	potential	gain	that	is	not	exploited.		Explicitly	 characterizing	 that	 gain	 in	 terms	 of	 real	 options	 or	 internal	markets	can	reveal	to	the	firm	how	it,	in	better	accommodating	its	workers,	can	improve	worker	productivity,	worker	satisfaction,	and,	importantly,	its	profitability.		
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